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1. Introduction
It goes without saying that the transportation infrastructure, which sup
ports economic activities in terms of their transport aspects, played an
important role in the industrialization process of modern Japan. Of these,
with the line expansion that began from the middle Meiji Period on, rail
ways grew to become the main axis of the transportation infrastructure.
Together with this came a reorganization of traditional transport means
comprised of roads, coastal maritime transport, and riverboat carrying^'. On
the basis of the new transport system having railways as its main axis, in
order to realize efficient transport, it was not sufficient to merely develop
the railway network; an essential condition was also to aim for smooth
connections between the railway network and transportation infrastructure
other than railways. Especially within materials transport, providing for full
connecting lines between railway and marine transportation, which were in
a mutually supporting relationship was, in tandem with the nationalization
of the railways in 1906, an important political issue for both the central and
regional governments^'. A clarification of the formation process for such
connecting lines between railway and marine transportation, as well as of
the role played by the government, is of indispensable importance in a
consideration of post railway-development infrastructure formation. In
regards to the formation of connecting lines between railway and marine
transportation, hitherto consideration has been given to the port of
Yokohama and the various ports along the Inland Sea coast. Here, how
ever, since the focus has been on the laying of private railway lines^', distri-
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bution'", and the formation of a warehousing industry^', there has not been
sufficient discussion concerning the role of government. Also, in previous
research, the approach has been made chiefly from the railway side. Yet as
the formation of connecting lines between railway and marine transporta
tion is comprised of the laying of railway lines to the ports and the
improvement of port facilities, even though the railway lines were in fact
laid, if no corresponding port facilities had existed, then the effects of these
connecting lines with marine transportation could not have been effectively
utilized. This means that an investigation which proceeds in regards to port
infrastructure establishment aspects is also indispensable®'.
Thus, in order to clarify these points, the present article concerns the
formation of a transportation infrastructure within Hyogo Prefecture from
the late Meiji Period to the Taisho Period. Hyogo Prefecture, which sup
ports numerous ports and harbors facing the Japan Sea in the north and
the Inland Sea in the south, has traditionally had a strong connection with
marine transportation. Against the backdrop of the demand for smoother
materials transport which arose with the progress of industrialization fol
lowing the Sino-Japanese War'', connections between the Tokaido Trunk
Line and the international trading port, Kobe, as well as connections
between the Sanyo Trunk Line and the various ports of the Inland Sea,
became an urgent issue. While on the one hand, the central government
aimed for the repair and establishment of the port of Kobe, and for its
connection with the Tokaido Trunk Line, the regional governments, in
response to the laying of private railway lines from the Sanyo Trunk Line to
the ports of the Inland Sea, performed port repair and establishment [in
their local areas]. In terms of the point that both the central and regional
governments sought to establish connection lines between railway and
marine transportation there, Hyogo Prefecture can be said to be a region
suitable for an investigation of the formation of connecting lines. In regards
to the railway and marine connection installations of Hyogo Prefecture, the
fundamental historical processes at the Kobe port, and in the laying of pri
vate railway lines, have each been hitherto elucidated®'. However, it is diffi
cult to say that there has been sufficient study regarding how the formed
connection lines functioned, or in regards to what impact these lines had
on materials transport. Further, the details of the port repair and establish
ment performed by the Prefecture remain mostly unclear. Therefore, within
the present article, the author desires to, while considering the regional
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economy and materials transport trends, perform a study regarding the for
mation of connecting lines between railway and marine transportation in
Hyogo Prefecture from the aspect of both railways and ports, and, as a
result, to elucidate the role played by governments, and also to clarify the
special characteristics of transportation infrastructure creation within the
late Meiji and Taisho Periods.
2. The Industry of Hyogo Prefecture, and its Regional Characteristics
Before beginning the investigation of the formation of connecting lines
between railway and marine transportation, let us take an overview look at
the prerequisite for such formation, the industry of Hyogo Prefecture. First,
when one takes a look at Table 1, which shows trends in industrial struc
ture, although agricultural production was increasing in terms of absolute
amounts, it was on a downward trend in terms of its percentage within all
production. Rice, with its major production site between the Banshu Plain,
accounted for 60%-70% of agricultural production, and when wheat is
added to this, this amounts to 80%. Rice was used for sake (rice wine) pro
duction as well as for eating, while wheat was the main ingredient of
Banshu somen noodles. Conversely, the 60% ratio held by industrial pro
duction in total production for 1905 rose, as a result of a major expansion
of production, to 80% in the Taisho Period. This makes it clear that by that
period, Hyogo Prefecture had reached a level of industrial development
such that it was centered on an industrial hub. Incidentally, the reason for
the decline in production prices in 1925 was the impact of the post-war
depression. Next, when one considers the structure of industrial production
Table 1 The industrial structure of Hyogo Prefecture
Units; ¥1,000 (%)
Agricultural
Production
Industrial
Production
Others Totals
1905 38,125 (32) 70,741 (60) 9,446 (8) 118,312 (100)
1910 40,832 (23) 123,121 (69) 13,215 (8) 177,168 (100)
1915 43,387 (15) 229,410 (80) 15,513(6) 288,310 (100)
1920 161,680 (15) 833,366 (79) 63,547 (5) 1,058,593 (100)
1925 132,393 (15) 722,641 (80) 49,351 (5) 904,385 (100)
(Note) "Others" are the totals for forestry, livestock production, mining and fisheries.
(Source) Hyogoken tokeisho (for each stated year)
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as shown in Table 2, the Industry of Hyogo Prefecture was comprised
chiefly of spinning products, along with machinery and tools, chemical
products, and foodstuffs and beverages. Representative items were cotton
thread, cotton woven goods, woolen woven goods, and wool thread
among spinning products, shipbuilding, iron production, forged goods, and
railway vehicles among machinery and tools, matches, fertilizer, paper,
rubber products and camphor among chemical products, and sake, sugar,
flour, beer, soy sauce, and somen noodles among foodstuffs and bever
ages. According to the "Hyogoken Tokeisho" [Hyogo Prefecture Statistics],
production amounts for these products showed a rising trend throughout
this period, and their respective percentages within industry overall were
relatively stable: cotton thread was around 20%, woven goods, sake, ship
building/iron production/forged goods were each around 10%, and the
other items were mostly between 5% to 1%.
Table 2 Structure of Hyogo Prefecture industrial production
(%)
Spinning
products
Machinery
and
tools
Chemical
products
Foodstuffs
and
beverages
Others Totals
1915 23 28 21 20 8 100
1920 34 23 19 17 8 100
1925 33 14 18 25 10 100
(Note) The respective structures for 1905 and 1910 are unknown.
{Source} Hyogoken tokeisho (for each stated year)
Now, what kind of regional characteristics did this kind of industrial
production show? Looking at the top-ranked cities in terms of industrial
production in 1925, the list shows Kobe City (38%; percentage of total
production amount), Muko County (9%), Kawabe County (9%), Amagasaki
City (5%), Himeji City (5%), Kako County (4%), Tsuna County (4%), Shikama
County (4%), Innami County (3%), and Nishinomiya City (3%)^'; other than
Tsuna County of Awaji Island, all of these are located along the Honshu-
Seto Inland Sea coast (refer to Fig. 1). Of these, when Muko County,
Kawabe County, Amagasaki City, and Nishinomiya City are added to Kobe
City, the Hanshin region accounted for 64% of the whole, while Himeji City,
Kako County, Shikama County and Innami County of the Harima region
accounted for 16%. One can get a glimpse here of the fact that, already at
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Fig. 1 Coastal section of Hyogo Prefecture (1925)
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this point in time, the prototype had been created for the post-World War II
Hanshin and Harima industrial belts. The formation of an industrial region
of this nature showed a strong side whereby development progressed as a
result of the location of factories by leading companies. As of 1925, when
one looks at each year of foundation for the 62 main factory sites located
within the nine counties and cities of the Hanshin and Harima regions^®', 52
sites, or 84% of the whole, were established from 1904 on, the year when
the Russo-Japanese War began. Twenty (20) sites (32%) were established
before World War I (1904-1913), 16 sites (26%) were founded during the
World War years (1914-1918), and 16 sites (26%) were established after the
World War (1919-1925). One can thus ascertain from the factory-location
aspect that the formation of the industrial region proceeded forward from
the post Russo-Japanese War on^^'. Also, of these 62 factories, at least 42
sites (68%) continued on to the period of Japan's high economic growth
[(1950s-early 1970s)]; this is surely back-up evidence for the idea that the
basis for the post-war industrial belts had been formed by the Taisho
Period.
Next, using 1925 as an example, let us take a look at the regionalization
of production, on a product-by-product basis, by considering spinning
products^2)_ jhe region that included Akashi City and Taka County added to
the 10 counties and cities listed above accounted for 87% of all production
amounts. Here, the following were established: in Kobe City, Kanegafuchi
Boseki [spinning] (1896: foundation year; ditto below), in Amagasaki City,
Dainihon Boseki (1891), in Kawabe County, Osaka Godo Boseki (1914),
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Mosurin [muslin] Bosekl (1923), and ItamI Seljusho (1923), In Muko County,
Mosurin Bosekl (1919), In NIshlnomlya City, Nalgalmen [Domestic and
Foreign Cotton] (1905), In AkashI City, Dalnlhon Bosekl (1909), and NIhon
Keorl [woolen weave] (1925), In Kako County, NIhon Keorl (1896), and
KanegafuchI Bosekl (1909), In InnamI County, NIhon Keorl (1919), In HImejl
City, NIhon Keorl (1914), and HInode Bosekl (1917), In Shikama County,
Fukushlma Bosekl (1896, 1913), Tatsuta Bosekl (1901), Toyo Bosekl (1919),
and Katakura SelshI Bosekl [thread-making and spinning] (1920), and In
Tsuna County, KanegafuchI Bosekl (1900). In terms of machine and tool
production amounts, Kobe City accounted for 79%, and together with
AmagasakI City (11%), the two cities accounted for 90% of production
amounts In this sector. Locating and expanding In Kobe City were, for the
production of ships, companies which manufactured various kinds of
machinery, railway vehicles, etc., Kawasaki Zosensho [shipbuilding works]
(1896, 1907. 1918), Mitsubishi Zosen [shipbuilding] (1905), Mitsubishi DenkI
[electric] (1905), Mitsubishi NalnenkI [Internal combustion engines] (1920),
Kobe Selkosho [Steel], Ltd. (1905), and Kobe Tetsudokyoku Kojo [railway
bureau factory] (1900). In AmagasakI City, NIhon Densen Seizo [electric
wire manufacturing] (1907), Sumitomo Shindosho [elongated copper
works] (1916), Furukawa DenkI Kogyo (1916), Kubota Tekkojo (1917), and
AmagasakI Shindosho (1921) manufactured electrical wire. Iron and copper
products, forged goods, etc. In addition, the Kobe Selkosho Harlma Zosen
Kojo [factory] (1912) In Ako County constructed ships, while the NIhon
Suplndoru Selsakusho [production works] (1918) In Kawabe County pro
duced spindles for the spinning of cotton thread.
Production amounts for chemical products were Kobe City (50%), Muko
County (8%), Kawabe County (5%), and AmagasakI City (7%) In the
Hanshin region, which, together with Kako County (11%), accounted for
81% of total production In this sector. Kobe City was a major production
site for rubber footwear, tires, and other rubber products and matches;
here, many small- and medium-sized factories bore the production burden,
and matches were an Important product exported from Kobe port to Asia.
In addition, NIhon Shono [camphor] (1890) and the Kobe Branch Office
(1900) of the Monopoly Bureau of the Government-General of Formosa
[Taiwan] produced camphor, a raw material for celluloid, etc., while Godo
YushI [oils and fats] Gurlserin [glycerin] (1916) produced hardened (hydro-
genated) oil. Indispensable for the manufacture of soap and glycerin. Muko
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County was a major production site of soy bean oil and cake, while to
Kawabe County, Fuji Seishi [papermaking] (1895), Kansai Peinto [paint]
(1918), Toyo Rinoryumu [linoleum] (1920), Shionogi Shoten [merchandiser]
(1922), and Takeda Shoten (1924) expanded, where they produced paper,
paints, linoleum, and medical care products. In Amagasaki City, Asahi
Garasu [glass] (1907) and Dainihon Beer Seibin Kojo [beer filling factory]
(1918) manufactured glass products, Toa Semento [cement] (1907) pro
duced cement, and Lever Brothers (1910) produced soap. In Kako County,
the artificial fertilizer manufactured by Taki Seihisho [fertilizer works] (1885),
and the paper produced by Mitsubishi Seishi (1898), accounted for the
majority of the chemical products. In addition to these cities and counties, a
Dainihon Seruroido [celluloid] factory (1908) was located in Ibo County,
which produced celluloid rawstuff. On the other hand, for foodstuffs and
beverages, Kobe City led with 41% of the entire production, followed by
Muko County (18%), Kawabe County (10%), Ibo County (8%), and
Nishinomiya City (6%); together, these accounted for 84% of all production
in this sector. Kobe City, with the location there of Nihon Seifun [miller]
(1917), Nisshin Seifun (1925), Taiwan Seito [sugar production] (1911), and
Meiji Seito (1923), became a major production site for flour and sugar, and,
in addition, confectionery manufacture was also performed there by small-
and medium-sized companies. Muko County and Nishinomiya City, which
constituted the Nadagogo area from the Edo Period on, were famous as
sake-brewing sites, and here, numerous large and small sake brewers alike
collected closely together. Also, in Muko County, Teikoku Yushi (1913) and
Honen Seiyu [oils production] (1918) produced foodstuff oils. In Kawabe
County, Nippon Beer Kosen (1907), Toyo Seito (1913), Kirin Beer (1918),
and Morinaga Seika [confectionery] (1922) produced soft drinks, sugar,
beer and candies. Sake production was also active in Itami, while Ibo
County was famous for the production of Tatsuno soy sauce and Banshu
somen noodles, local specialty products from the Edo Period on.
3. The Formation of Connecting Lines Between Railway and Marine
Transportation within the Port of Kobe
(1) The port establishment plan, and the laying of inland-marine connect
ing railway lines
The pioneering first step in an actual port establishment plan for the
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port of Kobe was the port-establishment survey performed by Kobe City
after the Sino-Japanese War. In May 1896, the Kobe City Council approved
a constructive resolution called the "Opinion Regarding the Duty of Port
Establishment." This expressed to the government a desire for port cre
ation as a response to the expansion of trade at the port of Kobe; in the
background, one can also recognize a spirit of rivalry vis-a-vis Osaka City,
which was making progress at the time in its own port establishment plan.
In July, the City Council passed a resolution regarding expenses for the
port-establishment survey, and Kobe City Mayor Yukikiyo Narutaki peti
tioned, via Kohei Sufu, the Governor of Hyogo Prefecture, the Ministry of
Home Affairs to dispatch engineers for the port-establishment survey. In
response to this petition, the Ministry of Home Affairs decided in January
1897 to dispatch the engineer Tadao Okino. The port-establishment survey
was carried out from February 1897 to October 1898. On the basis of this
survey, Okino created a port-establishment plan and a budget, and
reported these to the Ministry of Home Affairs. The plan envisioned the
reclaiming of Onohama, which existed on the east border of the Meriken
[American] Wharf, and the construction of three piers for ship mooring,
one breakwater, and an inland-marine connecting railway, with construc
tion expenses as high as 15.75 million yen^^'. In the creation of this plan,
Okino noted "aiming for the convenience of ship freight handling" as the
"most urgent work," while the construction of "an offshore breakwater to
realize safety" in the "anchoring" of ships was "an item to be relegated to
a future plan." As a reason why Okino would make a decision of this
nature, one can mention the point that, since Kobe was a good natural
port, it was not easily susceptible to the influences of winds and waves;
however, the biggest factor was insufficient port facilities. Although trade
amounts at the Kobe port were showing a rising tendency around the time
of (i.e., before and after) the Sino-Japanese War, freight-handling facilities
consisted only of two jetties, a small-scale private one, and a jetty dedi
cated to railway supplies of the Railway Bureau. Thus, to load and unload
freight, it was necessary to use barges and longshoremen. For this reason,
in the case of, for example, the unloading of 2,500 tons of iron materials
from a steamship, although this would take around two days with full-
fledge freight-handling facilities, here, 11 days were needed. Therefore, pri
ority was given to smoother ship freight handling, and the construction of
ship-mooring peers was planned^"'. Then, with the aim of an even greater
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efficiency of freight handling, the plan called for the inland-marine connect
ing railway to branch off from the Tokaido Line, and Okino assigned as
"the site for establishing a harbor railway depot" as "the most convenient
site within the newly reclaimed land"^®'.
The completed Okino draft plan was first submitted to the Port
Establishment Survey Committee of the City Council. The Committee found
this draft problematic in the point whereby the planned site for port estab
lishment leaned too heavily on the east side of the port of Kobe. Thus, the
Committee resolved to also construct two more piers at the mouth of the
Minato River on the west side of the port, stating that "it will be wise to
pursue the way of development which takes in both east and west"; the
Committee reported its decision to the City Mayor in June 1899. Here, total
construction costs were raised by 40%, to 22.00 million yen. Thereupon, the
City Council further added to the plan the construction of breakwaters
which Okino had left up to "a future plan," and, as a result of incorporating,
across-the-board, the desires of City Councilors, the scale of the final port-
establishment plan went very much beyond that called for in the Okino
draft: total construction expenses had risen to 26.14 million yen, of which
14.95 million yen was to be requested in the form of a National Treasury
subsidy, while the remainder was slated to be covered by city bonds worth
10.50 million yen, and city taxes of 0.7 million yen. This proposal was
reported in November 1899 to the Mayor, and, after it was approved by the
City Council in January 1900, Mayor Narutaki petitioned to both the
Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Finance on behalf of Kobe port
establishment^®'. In March 1900, the City Council also passed a resolution
entitled "The matter of a petition regarding the new construction of a rail
way depot along with electrical railway line modifications." This was to be
a petition to the government for, with the goal of an inland-marine connec
tion, the "new construction of a railway depot" in the "Shin-ikutagawa
vicinity," and the laying of a "branch line" there from the Tokaido Line.
Therefore, the petition was made with such tasks ranked as being for
"emergency facilities" required as a response to "the difficulties of freight
congestion" resulting from having insufficient port facilities. However, the
Ministry of Finance, which had adopted austere fiscal policies at this time,
did not approve of payment of a subsidiary which was nearly 15.00 million
yen, and the Kobe port establishment budget was not taken up by the 14th
National Diet during its session. In response, the Ministry of Home Affairs
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undertook, through to October 1900, a revision of the plan on the basis of
the Okino draft plan; it reduced the total construction costs and the
National Treasury subsidy to 12.00 million yen and 4.80 million yen,
respectively, and lobbied, in accordance with this revision, the Ministry of
Finance and also the Ministry of Communications, which was in charge of
railroads. However, the fiscal situation was severe, and the negotiations
ended in failure^^'. Meanwhile, why did the Kobe City Council, at this point
in time when the port-establishment plan had already been established,
perform its own petition containing overlapping details? It goes without
saying that the City Councilors were aware of the fact that "full planning
[was] currently underway on the duty of port revision and establishment";
yet, on the other hand, since "the item of port revision and establishment"
would "require massive expense amounts," it would also be necessary to
"wait several years until one could expect the completion" of such work^®'.
At a time when the government was experiencing a severe fiscal situation,
it can be inferred that, as a method of realizing, in a sure and early way,
inland-marine connections, the City Councilors selected as one form of
insurance the laying of harbor railway lines, which could be completed
with construction expenses which were comparatively less than those for
port creation.
The background for the City Council's hurrying in this way to form con
necting lines between railway and marine transportation was the contem
porary awareness that "the inconvenience to be suffered by domestic and
foreign trading entities" would be "not just a minimum"; the traders them
selves worked at lobbying the government. Leaders of this movement
were powerful traders and entrepreneurs from Kobe and Osaka, such as
Fusajiro Kanematsu (Kanematsu Shoten), a pioneer in Japanese-Australian
trade who had appealed from early on for the necessity of Kobe port
improvements, Sanji Muto (Manger of the Hyogo branch of Kanegafuchi
Boseki), Tamotsu Yai (Director of the Kobe branch of Nihon Yusen [postal
ships]), Kure Daigtoro (Director of the Kobe Branch of Mitsui Bussan),
Ichitaro Tanaka (president of Nihon Menka [cotton]) and Rihei Kawamura.
Considering the point that these leaders included persons who were
involved in the cotton industry and in cotton products trade, it is of deep
interest to refer this to the special characteristics of the then-traded prod
ucts at the port of Kobe^®'. At that time, cotton tread and cotton were the
most exported and imported goods at Kobe port: in 1902, cotton thread
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accounted for 20% of export amounts, while cotton was 46% of Import
amounts, and in 1903, 30% of the exported cotton tread was produced in
Osaka (ranked number 1 [in Japan]), while 27% was produced in Hyogo
(ranked number 2)2°'. It was surely only natural that those involved in the
cotton industry in the Hanshin area would vigorously work towards more
complete trading facilities. In December 1899, these persons submitted an
opinion document to the government, in which they requested a branch
extension from the Tokaido Line to within the Onohama site of Kobe
Customs. They also traveled to the capital of Tokyo, where they explained
the necessity of the inland-marine connection to government authorities^^'.
As a result of this continuous lobbying by both government officials
and private citizens, the laying of inland-marine connection lines was finally
approved by the government. In December 1901, the Ministry of
Communications submitted a budget of 1.20 million yen to the 16th
National Diet, and this passed both houses in February 1902. The govern
ment's burden was less than 1/10th of the National Treasury subsidy
requested in the previously proposed port-establishment plan, and this
likely made railway creation more fiscally acceptable. The plan called for a
branching of the railroad midway between the Sannomiya and Sumiyoshi
Stations of the Tokaido Line, to Onohama, with the construction of a new
Nada station at the branching point, and of the Onohama Station at the ter
minal point. Surveying began in April 1902, construction got underway in
July 1903, and although the construction work was temporarily halted
during the Russo-Japanese War, it began again after the war, and was
completed in July 1907; business began on the line in August 190722'.
Nevertheless, the inland-marine connecting railway did not fully fulfill its
functions during the period when the line was initially opened. That is, one
can ascertain from Table 3 that it took around 10 years to achieve stability
in the freight handling amounts on the inland-marine connecting line. The
first factor which can be stated here is the fact that no customs branch
office was established in Onohama. To use the connecting line, it was
required to make an extra transport, for the performance of customs proce
dures, between the Customs House and Onohama. Also, due to fiscal
restraints, there were not enough freight storage sheds and warehouses in
the vicinity of stations, and freight owners and transporters felt the incon
venience. The second factor was that dredging was not performed along
the Onohama coast, despite its shallow waters. Thus, even though four dis-
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Table 3 Trends in freight handling amounts on the inland-
marine connecting railway
Unit: tons
Freight amts. Freight amts.
1907 22,941 1917 253,874
1908 40,042 1918 563,920
1909 75,480 1919 637,663
1910 92,725 1920 521,640
1911 176,071 1921 439,180
1912 146,433 1922 493,508
1913 167,336 1923 528,168
1914 105,945 1924 584,092
1915 208,128 1925 553,869
1916 129,332 1926 572,400
(Note) The totals of sent freight and received freight.
(Source) Hyogoken tokeisho (for each stated year)
charge sites were constructed, ships and barges were not able to make
smooth approaches to pier sides^^*. In sum, there were self-inherent limita
tions in responses which could be made in terms of port facilities by the
Ministry of Communications, which was responsible for railways. This
result of this was to show anew the necessity of performing full-fledged
port establishment with the goal of full-scale connecting lines between rail
way and marine transportation. Thus, the movement which recognized this
point and sought for port establishment was underway even before the
opening of the inland-marine connecting line.
(2) Kobe port establishment, and the strengthening of connecting lines
between railway and marine transportation
Kanematsu and his fellow entrepreneurs who were involved in trying to
realize connecting lines between railway and marine transportation formed,
in April 1900, "Boeki Chosa Kai" [the trade investigation board]. Newly join
ing this group were Tetsutaro Sakurai, the Kobe Customs Director, Ichizo
Hattori, Governor of Hyogo Prefecture, and Heitaro Tsubono, Mayor of
Kobe City. This group performed "investigation and research" concerning
"port improvements" and "the expansion of customs," and based on its
results. Customs Director Sakurai reported to his superiors at the Ministry
of Finance a draft plan to expand the Onohama breakwater. This draft plan
85
called for the reclaiming of the sea located in front of Onohama, the expan
sion of customs facilities, the construction of sheds and warehouses, plus
the construction of a single pier (to be used also as a jetty) and a jetty, as
well as the extension of the inland-marine connecting railway. Herein was
also anticipated the dredging of the sea floor in the jetty vicinities for per
mit the mooring of ships of 10,000 tons or more. This plan would provide
some kind of a solution for the problem points of the inland-marine con
nection line which the author has pointed out in the previous section. Here,
the assumption was for construction fees of 3.45 million yen and a seven
year period of continuous construction^"'. As a corresponding response to
the report of the Customs Director, Governor Hattori also made unofficial
reports to the Ministries of Home Affairs and Finance of the necessity for
port establishment. In response, the Ministry of Finance commanded its
Customs and Tariffs Extraordinary Construction Division to perform a sur
vey, and also to create a design plan. In September 1902, the design plan
was reported for consultation to the Ministry's Open Port Facilities
Investigation Committee, and, as a result of this Committee's recognition of
the necessity, a port establishment budget was submitted to the 19th
National Diet of 1903. The draft design plan slated 3.96 million yen for total
construction costs, and a construction period of six years, while in other
points, it followed Sakurai's draft proposal; here, the purpose was stated as
"the completion of facilities and equipment of an inland-marine transport
organization" through the linking of the established port with the connect
ing railway 2®'.
Although the port construction budget was placed on the Diet's
agenda, the Diet was adjourned prior to a vote, and afterwards, with the
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the budget was shelved yet again.
After the War, however. Customs Director Sakurai once again reported to
his superiors at the Ministry of Finance, and the Chambers of Commerce of
both Kobe and Osaka, as well as Dainihon Boseki Rengokai [spinning asso
ciation], also resolved and requested the improvement of facilities at the
Kobe Customs Office. As a result, the Ministry of Finance submitted to the
22nd National Diet of 1906 the same port-establishment budget of the pre
vious year. This budget passed both houses in March 1906, and it was con
firmed that, from fiscal 1906, Kobe port establishment would be performed
over a six year continuous period, with total construction costs of 3.96
million yen. The Ministry of Finance established in Kobe a branch office of
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the Extraordinary Construction Division, and construction began in April
1906^®'. Although the reasons are unclear why the Ministry of Finance,
which had evinced a negative attitude up to that time, decided to promote
port establishment, problems did in fact exist for the trading facilities at the
port of Kobe, even to the extent that this point was indicated from within
the Ministry itself (i.e., by Customs); it can also be thought that as the gov
ernment body in charge of foreign trade, the Ministry was forced to begin
with the modernization of this trading port which was a representative of
Japan. Another factor which spurred on this decision was the fact that,
from 1899, the Ministry was already involved in port establishment for
Yokohama in the form of an expansion of the customs facilities there. Still,
the construction costs of 3.96 million yen were only one-fourth the scale of
those included within the Okino draft plan: one can glimpse here the fact
that the Ministry of Finance was still holding firmly to its tight fiscal poli
cies. Therefore, even though the design details of expanding the customs
facilities, creating one pier and one jetty, and expanding the railway thereto
did fill the essential conditions for connecting lines between railway and
marine transportation, from the perspective of aiming for full-fledged con
nection functions, there was still room for improvement. Thus, even after
work on port establishment began, preparations were already underway
for a further expansion of the plan.
Kobe City Mayor Hiromi Mizukami took the initiative in this movement.
In June 1906, he privately created a pamphlet which expostulated the
necessity of expanding the scale of the port establishment, and he distrib
uted his pamphlet to the various concerned parties and industries, with the
goal of stimulating a rise in public opinion. The Kobe City Council also
newly set up a Port Establishment Committee, and made preparatory
arrangements to realize port creation^^'. On the other hand, in the Ministry
of Finance, too, the Extraordinary Construction Division which was respon
sible for the port creation was dissatisfied with the plan as established; it
created a large-scale plan which called for the construction of a breakwater
which would surround the entire port, to be performed in three phases,
with port preparations for Onohama, east of Onohama, and west of the
Minato River. Yet the Construction Division, too, was forced to give "careful
consideration to the national finances," and, for the time being, it adopted
a policy of a one-phase construction, whereby the Onohama sea surface
would be reclaimed, four mooring piers and one pier-plus-breakwater
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would be constructed, facilities such as sheds, etc., would be provided for
at the piers, and the connecting railway would be expanded. Even for this,
however, total construction costs rose to 20.26 million yen. Since there was
no expectation that the national government would bear the entire amount,
the Construction Division's Kobe Branch held private consultations with
Kobe City to feel out a draft design, including the bearing by the City of
construction costs. In response, the City decided to have deliberations per
formed within the Port Construction Investigation Committee, to accept
expense burdens, and to negotiate with the government for a rapid com
pletion of the port establishment
The fact that a large-scale port establishment plan was created within
the Ministry of Finance, which had adopted a prudent stance in terms of
fiscal resources, evinces the deeply interesting phenomenon that all was
not monolithically unified within the Ministry. Yet in order to secure a bud
get for a large amount and to realize port establishment, the existence of a
strong political force was a necessity. The person who took on this role,
and who contributed to an expansion of the scale of port creation, was the
then Minister of Finance, Yoshiro Sakatani. Appointed Minister of Finance
at the creation of the first Saionji Cabinet, Sakatani believed that "the
source of the national strength is in its trading ports," and that Japan must
"strive for, through providing for more convenient inland-marine commu
nications, establishing and arranging transport organizations, and reducing
production costs, the prosperity of trade." According to Sakatani, up to that
time, Japan had "exhausted its power" in "extending railway lines and
stimulating navigation," but as for "connecting facilities between the land
and the sea," the country had "viewed such extremely lightly." Therefore,
within "the ports of Japan," there existed no "facilities which connect the
inland with the sea," and "between the land and ships" there were "enor
mous costs involved." He stated that the relatively high transport costs
were "an extreme deficiency" when, within "the commerce with China and
Korea," Japan "expected a victory" in the "competition" with "Europe and
the United States." Therefore, it is necessary to "somehow make this con
nection between land and sea." However, "Since it would be difficult to
provide facilities at all Japanese ports," Sakatani listed as "ports which I
feel today most require" such facilities are the ports of "Yokohama and
Kobe." Further, as a result of Japan having, via the Russo-Japanese War,
"obtained the right to protect Korea, secured with a certainty this right, and
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planted a new sphere of power within Manchuria," "the distance between
the Hanshin region and Manchuria and Korea" had become "extremely
close," and the issue whereby "the repair and establishment of the port of
Kobe must not be neglected" was of extreme importances^'. It is thought
that the Extraordinary Construction Division of the Ministry of Finance
would surely be well aware that their Minister, Sakatani, had these ideas,
and one can surmise that on that basis, the Construction Division planned
for a large-scale port establishment.
In September 1906, Sakatani, together with Tanomo Tsumaki, Manager
of the Extraordinary Construction Division, toured the port of Kobe, and at
a banquet to welcome him, Sakatani announced an improvement-construc
tion plan for the Kobe port. This plan included the reclaiming of the ocean-
front on both the east and west sides of Onohama, the construction of four
piers on the west side and two piers on the east side, the provisions of
sheds, cranes, etc., at each pier, and also the extension of the connecting
railway line. Also, a breakwater would be constructed within the Onohama
offing. In addition to these, in the Hyogo direction (at the mouth of the
Minato River), two jetties would be constructed, the same facilities would
be provided for these jetties as at Onohama, a new inland-marine railway
line would be laid from the Sanyo Trunk Line, and, at the vicinity of the
piers and jetties, dredging would be performed. Construction costs were
estimated at 29.21 million yen for the Onohama direction, and 1.49 million
yen for the Hyogo direction, for a total of 30.70 million yen, while the con
struction period was estimated to be 8 years for the Onohama direction,
and 4 years for the Hyogo direction^®'. One can say that the Sakatani port-
establishment proposal would have more than sufficiently realized land-
marine connection facilities, in the aspects of both facilities and equipment,
and in terms of project scale.
Since within this plan, too, Kobe City was to be made responsible for a
portion of the construction costs, the Extraordinary Construction Division,
using the Yokohama port establishment as an example, requested the City
to bear one-third of the construction costs. The Kobe City Council voted its
unanimous approval for this, and in November 1906, the port establish
ment costs were incorporated within the Ministry of Finance's budget,
which was then relegated to Cabinet deliberation. Incidentally, concen
trated within the general budget for fiscal 1907 were requests by each
Ministry in lieu of the postwar prosperity, and on top of this, an increase in
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military expenses was also slated. These factors plunged into obscurity the
question of whether the port-establishment budget would pass the Cabinet.
In this situation, based on its discussions with the Budget Bureau of the
Ministry of Finance, and as a sure means of realizing the port establish
ment, the Construction Division divided the plan into two phases and
reduced the budgeted amount, and announced a corresponding policy
whereby, for the first phase construction under the new plan, port con
struction of the Onohama west side portion would be performed at a con
struction cost of ¥13.13 million. The Bureau then persuaded Finance
Minister Sakatani, who had been stressing the maintenance of the original
plan, to accept the new plan; Mayor Mizukami also gave his approval, and
in December, the budget passed at a Cabinet meeting. It was also clearly
stated in the budget document that second phase construction would be
performed in the near future^^'. Although this meant that a reduction in
scale had to be accepted for the Sakatani plan, even with that, compared
with the previous plan, this plan can be praised for the fact that it increased
from two to four the number of piers, that it also provided for land-based
facilities, and that, in terms of its facilities aspects, the plan had sufficient
contents. In fact, sufficient fruits were realized with this revised plan, includ
ing the fact that, within a narrow budget framework, port-construction
expenses of over 13.00 million yen were approved, and also that a substan
tive statement was secured regarding the implementation of phase two
construction. Factors which made this possible included, in addition to the
fact that the establishment of the port of Kobe was an issue of great
urgency, also the fact that the plan had been advocated by the Minister of
Finance.
At any rate, the port-establishment plan was approved at a meeting of
the government's Kowan Chosakai [the ports and harbors investigation
board] in December 1906, and also at a deliberative council meeting, held
in January 1907, which was joined by engineers and marine transport spe
cialists. The government submitted the port-establishment budget to the
23rd National Diet, and in March 1907, the budget passed both the House
of Peers and the House of Representatives, thereby confirming port estab
lishment for Kobe. Construction costs were estimated at 13,139,407 yen,
which, when added to the already confirmed port-establishment costs of
3.96 million yen, computed to a total of 17,099,407 yen. Of this, Kobe City
was slated to bear 4.37 million yen, equivalent to one-third of the construe-
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tion costs, and continuous construction work was planned for an eight
year period beginning from fiscal 1906. The groundbreaking ceremony,
attended by Finance Minister Sakatani, was held in September 1907 at
Onohama, and, after an extension of the construction period, construction
was completed in May 1922. During that period, expenses rose and
declined as a result of minute design changes and price rises; in the end,
total construction costs had dropped to 15,092,037 yen, and, in tandem
with this, the amount borne by Kobe City became 3,669,802 yen^^'.
Next, an investigation will be made of the fruits of port establishment,
while referring to a diagram of the completed construction (Fig. 2). The four
piers were each 360 meters long and 100 meters wide, and the interval
between piers 1 and 2 was 162 meters, with the other intervals being 144
meters each. With the exception of the sea wall on the east side of pier 1,
ship berths were constructed on both sides of each pier; here two or three
ships could be anchored. Also, for these ships, navigation lanes were
dredged at the front of the piers and in the intervals between piers. Water
depth was 9 meters at low tide, while 11 meters was secured for the inter
val between piers 1 and 2 and also for their approaching ship lanes. This
was surely a sufficient depth, as there were no ships navigating Asian
waters at that time which had a maximum load draught exceeding 10
meters. The reason for providing a broad interval and a more-than-suffi-
Fig. 2 Diagram of the Completed Kobe Port Creation
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cient depth between piers 1 and 2 was as a measure which hypothesized
the arrival of large-sized ships after their passage through the Panama
Canal. On the other hand, a depth of 3 meters was secured, and three
freight loading-and-unloading sites were provided, for barge freight. These
facilities were used in the order in which they were completed. In 1920,
2.09 million tons of freight was handled, roughly equivalent to the annual
handled quantity of 2.10 million tons projected in the initial plan. The quan
tity of freight imported and exported at the Kobe port was 4.49 million tons
in the same year (1920); 2.09 million tons is thus 47% of this figure. Since
the projected freight handling amount for the second phase of port struc
ture was estimated to be an annual 1.90 million tons, if the first and second
phases of port construction could have been performed at the same time,
there should have been around 4.00 million tons of freight handled using
the new facilities. For this reason, one can evaluate the actual handled
quantity results of 2.09 million tons as constituting favorable results. 16
steel-built sheds were provided on the piers, and two wooden sheds were
constructed at the no. 1 freight loading-and-unloading site; the total area of
these structures reached to 16,000 tsubo (1 tsubo = approx. 3.3 sq. m.).
Tracks were laid between the sheds and the ship-mooring berths, and
above these, automatic cranes performed the loading and unloading of
freight. Railway lines, which were laid on the inner sides of these tracks,
were used to transport freight. Railway lines were also provided on the rear
sides of the iron and wooded sheds; each of these lines was connected, via
the inland-marine connection line, with the Tokaido line^^'.
What impact did such facilities have on the business of the connecting
railway? Let us investigate the trends in freight handling amounts on the
connecting railway, as shown in Fig. 3, with reference to the development
of the port establishment. The first of the freight facilities to be completed,
the no. 1 freight loading-and-unloading site and the wooden sheds, were
first used in common in 1911. Freight handling amounts for that year
nearly doubled those of the previous year. Afterwards, completed mooring
berths and sheds were used in succession, until in 1915, although only por-
tionally, all piers were in common use for the first time; in that year, too,
there was a doubling of handling amounts. At this time, however, the rail
way lines for the pier portions were still under construction, and transport
between the sheds and the Onohama Station was performed using carts
and horse-drawn wagons. Shared use of the railway lines began in
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January 1917. In the same month, for the greater convenience of transport,
the Kobe Port Cargo Handling Office was placed at the base of pier 2. With
the shared use of the railway lines underway, the Railways Bureau began
work in March 1917 on the reclaiming of land in front of the Onohama
Station, as here a site was needed for the concentration of freight, and on
the new construction of a marshaling yard and sheds; this work was com
pleted in October 1917. A marshaling yard is an indispensable facility for
the smooth operation of a railroad, and in the next year, 1918, the amount
of handled freight increased by more than 2 times over the previous year,
and this figure continued to show stable results thereafter3^'. In this way, in
can be said that the inland-marine connecting railway was made to fulfill its
functions in tandem with progress made on the port establishment.
Next, let us take a look at 1924, as an example of year for which numer
ical quantities regarding freight on the connecting railway are known. The
main traded goods in 1924 were, for imports, cotton (36%; ratio among all
import amounts), machinery (5%), wool thread (5%), lamb's wool (4%), and
iron plating (4%), and for exports, raw thread (15%; ratio among all export
amounts), habutae (silk) (9%), fujiginu [silk] and pongee (7%), raw
canequim and seating (6%), twilled cotton (4%), and cotton thread
The reason why raw thread and silk woven goods were the top-ranked
export goods was the fact that exports of these had shifted from the port of
Yokohama to the Kobe port following the Great Kanto Earthquake [of
1923]. Of these items, one can confirm five types of goods which were car
ried as freight on the inland-marine connecting railway: cotton, machinery,
iron plating, cotton woven goods, and cotton thread. From among these,
for cotton, cotton woven goods, and cotton thread, the respective amounts
transported by railway, and, depending on the commodities, either export
or import quantities, can be ascertained. The other items, however, were
not included as objects for railway statistical surveys, and it thus cannot be
confirmed whether or not these other items were transported using the
connecting railway. For the three items listed above (i.e., cotton, cotton
woven goods, and cotton thread), the following results are obtained when
one computes either, when such is an imported product, their sent freight
on the connecting railway ratio vis-a-vis their respective import quantity, or,
when such is an exported product, their arrived freight by the connecting
railway ratio vis-a-vis their respective export quantity: cotton, 78%; cotton
woven goods, 72%; cotton thread, 10%^®'. When one considers the fact that
93
the amount of freight handled In 1920 by the new port-establishment facili
ties accounted for 47% of all handled freight at the Kobe port, the connect
ing railway usage rate was high for cotton and cotton woven goods, while
for some reason, it is thought that for cotton thread, which had a low con
necting railway usage rate, the pre-existing port facilities were used.
Although it goes without saying that these product types were just a por
tion of all exported and imported goods, the number one imported good
was cotton, while cotton woven goods replaced cotton thread as an impor
tant export good in the post-War period One can infer that the reason
why such positive use was made of the inland-marine connecting facilities
for the trade of these commodities was the fact that a high estimate was
made regarding the efficiency of the connecting lines between railway and
marine transportation. Although the issue of the second phase construction
still remained, one can evaluate that the goals for that period of aiming for
connections between the transportation infrastructure and of realizing
smooth freight transport were, initially at least, achieved.
4. Regional Ports Involved in the Formation of Connecting Lines
Between Railway and Marine Transportation
(1) The establishment of railroads to the ports
In the Hyogo Prefecture of the post-Russo-Japanese War period, there
was active construction of branch lines which branched from the trunk
lines of the Prefecture, namely, the Tokaido Trunk Line, The Sanyo Trunk
Line, and the Fukuchiyama Line. Through to the end of the Taisho Period,
major links thereof which served to connect marine with land transporta
tion were the Bantan Railway, the Befu Light Railway, the Banden Railway,
and the Ako Railway (refer to Fig. 3). Against the backdrop of the advance
ment of industrialization in the Harima region, these railway lines were
responsible for the transportation of passengers, products, and the raw
materials for products. Here, an investigation is made, in succession, of the
history of the establishment of these four railways and the status of
trasport.
1) Bantan Railway
The Bantan Railway was originally named the "Banshu Railway"; this
was a light railway whose establishment was requested to the government
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Fig. 3 Diagram of railway lines for inland-marine connections
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in November 1910 by its organizers, chiefly landowners, commercial per
sonages, and industrialists who lived along the proposed line. The pro
posed line was comprised of a trunk line which connected Takasago port
with Nishiwaki Town, and which branched in between these two points
into two branches, one which went to Miki Town, and the other to Hojo
Town. Meanwhile, a connection was made with the Sanyo Trunk Line at
the Kakogawa Station of the Banshu trunk line. In January 1911, the gov
ernment decided to confer a license, and the organizers established, in May
1911 and with a capitalization of 1.80 million yen, the Banshu Railway Co.,
Ltd. In June, petition was made to the government to perform construction
work, and approval was granted in September. The period from construc
tion start to construction finish was assumed to fall within the two-and-a-
half year period following the granting of the approval. The construction
work began from the trunk line. However, a rise in construction costs cou
pled with an economic recession meant that little progress was made in
procuring funds, and the company requested to the government an exten
sion of the construction completion period. The trunk line between
Takasago Ura [bay] and Nishiwaki was opened in September 1914, while
the Hojo Branch Line was opened in March 1915, and the Miki Branch Line
in June 1917. For the Banshu Railway, in addition to these lines, a connec
tion was also sought with the Tanigawa Station of the Fukuchiyama Line,
and at the same time, an extension of the trunk line was also planned.
Although business began between Nishiwaki and Kajiya in May 1923 and
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between Nomura and Tanigawa in December 1924, during the above-
described period, due to the impact of the wartime recession, business
results worsened, until the company plunged into a management crisis.
Therefore, in 1923, the Bantan Railway Co., Ltd., was newly established,
and the railway was transferred to this company with the aim of a continu
ation of business^®'.
In the region surrounding the Banshu Railway many traditional prod
ucts were produced, including Banshu rice, Banshu woven goods, rock and
wooden materials, the cutlery of Miki Town, hardware, etc. Although it
goes without saying that the railroad was established there with the
prospect of transporting such goods, the company especially viewed as
potential freight-business customers the factories in Takasago Town of
Mitsubishi Seishi and Kanegafuchi Boseki. Hitherto, both of these factories
had relied on either marine transport at the Takasago port or the Kakogawa
Station of the Sanyo Line for the transportation of products, raw materials,
and fuel, while vehicle transport was used for the intervals between the fac
tory and the port and the railway station. Since the Banshu Railway con
nected with the port and the station, this was used as a substitute for
vehicles for the transportation of goods and materials. To facilitate the
inland-marine connection, the freight yard at the Takasago Lira Station was
built such that it bordered on the Takasago port. The company petitioned
the government, and, simultaneously with the opening of the trunk line, the
company also began through-traffic operation of Bureau-line affiliated
freight cars. And at Takasago Ura, a sidetrack was extended to reach the
factory of Kanegafuchi Boseki. In the following year (1915), a fuel transport
contract was signed with Nippon Keori of Kakogawa Town, which had pro
vided its own exclusive railway to the Kakogawa Station of the Sanyo Line.
Here, coal unloaded at the Takasago port was carried to the factory from
the Takasago Ura Station. From 1917, in response to the requests of
Mitsubishi Seishi, Kanegafuchi Boseki, and Nihon Keori, the company also
took up the management of the marine transportation business, and went
so far as to perform the transport of coal from the port of Wakamatsu to
the Takasago port®®'.
Looking at this transportation relationship with these factories by using
1924 as an example, pulp (2,203,000 yen) ranked number one in terms of
monetary amount brought in that year via the Takasago port, while num
ber two was the coal (1,840,000 yen) carried in originally via the
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Wakamatsu port. These two items together accounted for 48% (8,382,000
yen) of the via-port imported amounts. Most of the 4,444 tons of pulp
brought in via the ports served as raw material for Mitsubishi Seishi. Of the
25,720 tons of via-port carried in coal, 30% or 7,236 tons, was transported
to the Kakogawa Station, etc., where Nippon Keori was located, while the
remainder was mainly used at the factories of Mitsubishi Seishi and
Kanegafuchi Boseki. To the Takasago Station alone was transported, via
the Sanyo Line, 3,010 tons of pulp. Paper produced at the Mitsubishi Seishi
factory was carried from the Takasago Station via the Sanyo Trunk line to
consumption points, and the amount of paper handled at that Station was
13,369 tons, the 8th highest rank in Japan. Similarly, the raw material cot
ton and the cotton thread of Kanegafuchi Boseki were also transported via
the Sanyo Trunk Line; 5,655 tons of cotton was handled at the Takasago
Ura Station, 15th in Japan, while cotton thread reached 6,001 tons, 7th in
Japan^°>. When one looks at the amount of freight handled at the Takasago
Ura and Takasago stations from 1915, the year after the opening of the
Banshu Trunk Line, through to 1930, these stations consistently accounted
for, respectively, number one and number two of all of the stations of the
Banshu (Bantan) Railway, with their respective percentages showing a
trend of around 23% for Takasago Ura, and around 10% for Takasago, sta
tions. Here one can recognize how these two stations, which handled over
30% of all of the freight on that Railway, functioned as the core stations for
materials transport"^'. In this way, one can affirm that the Bantan Railway
corresponded to the transport demand of large-scaled factories, through
the use of its marine-land connection function via the Takasago Ura Station
as well as its connections with the Sanyo Trunk Line, played a supporting
role in terms of transportation aspects in the industrialization of the Harima
region.
2) Befu Light Railway
The Befu Light Railway was a railroad established chiefly by Kumejiro
Taki, who managed the Taki Seihisho [fertilizer works] in Befu Village, and
his family. With the aim of more convenient transportation of the perphos-
phoric acid fertilizer and compound fertilizers manufactured at his com
pany, Taki requested the government in July 1911 to establish a light
railway to connect Befu port with the Kakogawa Station of the Sanyo Trunk
Line. In October of that year, Taki received a permit, but since at this time.
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work had begun by the Banshu Railway on the construction of a railroad
line between Kakogawa and Takasago, difficulties arose In terms of acquir
ing land; the plan was shelved, and the permit was Invalidated
Thereupon, In June 1913, TakI requested the establishment of a light rail
way to connect Befu port with the KItazaIke Station of the Banshu Railway;
the connecting station with the Banshu Railway was aften/vards changed
from KItazaIke to NoguchI, which was located near the Kakogawa Station,
and TakI obtained a permit In November 1913. The request to perform con
struction work was delayed due to the sluggish sale of stock as a result of
the recession and the outbreak of World War I. Official approval was
received In July 1915, and In the same month, the Befu Light Railway Co.,
Ltd., was established with a capitalization of 140,000 yen. Although con
struction began In December 1916, delays occurred not only because It
took time to acquire land, but also due to materials procurement delays
due to Interruptions In Imports caused by the World War. Thus a request
was made to government for an extension of the construction deadline. In
August 1921, the road was opened between the NoguchI and the Mlnato-
guchl [port mouth] stations. The MInato-guchI Station was a freight-only
station facing the Befu port. From the Befu-ko [port] Station, a side track
was laid to the neighboring TakI Selhlsho. Operational management of the
Befu Light Railway was consigned to the Banshu Railway, with which the
Befu Light Railway connected. From October 1921 on, through-traffic oper
ation was performed using freight cars of the Banshu Railway, as well as
freight cars belonging to the Ministry of Railways. On the other hand, the
Befu Light Railway Co., which had from the first desired a direct connection
with the Sanyo Trunk Line, requested In April 1919 an extension of the rail
way to between Befu port and the Tsuchlyama Station of the Sanyo Line.
The license was received In January 1920, and approval was obtained to
perform construction In March 1921. Construction began In November
1921, and the line between Tsuchlyama and the Befu port was opened In
March 1923. With the opening of the Tsuchlyama Line, the operations con
signment to the Banshu Railway was canceled, and the company Itself took
up management and operation. In the same way, the Befu Light Railway
company also began new through-traffic operations using Ministry line
freight cars via the Tsuchlyama Statlon^^'.
The chief purpose of the Befu Light Railway was the transport of the
artificial fertilizer and Its raw materials of the TakI Selhlsho. For the artificial
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fertilizer transport prior to the opening of the railway, reliance was made on
the marine transportation of Befu port, which was near the factory, or the
fertilizer was carried by land to the Tsuchiyama Station, and the Sanyo
Trunk Line was used. In 1919, 6,404 tons of artificial fertilizer was sent from
the Tsuchiyama Station. It is unclear how much artificial fertilizer was trans
ferred via the port in the same year; however, looking at the known figures
for 1916, the amount transferred was 73,000 tons, which was more than 10
times the amount transported by railway. One can thus infer that prior to
the establishment of the railway, there was a high reliance on marine trans
portation. In converse to this, in 1924, after the opening of the Tsuchiyama
Line, the amount of artificial fertilizer transported from the Befu-ko [port]
Station via Ministry Railways was 49,240 tons, 5th in Japan in terms of
handled amounts^^'. Here one can get a glimpse of the remarkable growth
in railroad usage rates, due to the laying of railway lines which reduced the
inconveniences of land transport, and also thanks to the realization of joint
transport with Ministry lines. Since the figures are unclear for the amount
of artificial fertilizer transferred via the port around the same year (1924),
one must thus refer to the "Hyogoken Tokeisho" for monetary amounts
transferred via Befu port. Here, one sees a trend of around 4.00 million yen
for the corresponding period. Due also to the fact that it is hard to imagine
that there were any changes during this period in the configuration of prod
ucts which were being transferred via the port, there is a strong possibility
that fertilizer via-port amounts were at the same levels in 1924 as in 1916.
Therefore, even after the establishment of the railroad, although the via-
port route maintained its supremacy due to the connection between
marine transportation and the railway, one can say that it was the railway,
via the Ministry line, which bore the burden of via-port transportation for
the increased fertilizer production amounts.
On the other hand, prior the establishment of the railway, phosphate
rock, sulfuric acid, ammonium sulfate, nitric acid, and other raw materials
for the artificial fertilizer were carried using the same transportation meth
ods as those for the fertilizer. Compared with the 6,726 tons of ore handled
at the Tsuchiyama Station in 1919, for the same reasons as stated in the
previous paragraph, when one looks at the amount of ore brought in via
the Befu port in 1916, this was 55,000 tons, or eight times as much as that
carried over railroad. Thus, in term of via-port amounts for raw materials,
one also sees the large relative weight of marine transportation. In 1924,
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after the Tsuchiyama Line was opened, the amount carried in by railway
had increased somewhat to 10,046 tons. Since the figures are unclear for
the amount brought in via the port in the same year, using the same logic
as described in the previous paragraph, when one looks at via-port transfer
monetary amounts, one sees a trend of around 5.00 million yen for the cor
responding period. It is thus inferred that via-port amounts were at the
same levels in 1924 as in 1916. Although it can be said that marine trans
portation continued to serve as the core inbound raw materials route even
after the railway began operations^®*, ore which was brought in via the Befu
port was carried from the Minatoguchi Station to the factory, via a side
track of the Befu-ko Station. Although it is unclear why the increase in car-
ried-in raw material amounts was small compared with the amount of fer
tilizer carried out, one can surmise that one factor was the attempt at that
time by the Taki Seihisho to increase its own facilities for the self-manufac
ture of sulfuric acid, which is indispensable for the manufacture of super
phosphate fertilizer^®*. One also cannot deny the possibility of there existing
omissions in the statistics. Looking at the "Hyogoken Tokeisho", one sees
that annual freight handling amounts at the Befu-ko Station continued to
increase from the time the railway was opened; after the Tsuchiyama Line
was opened, this reached to around 60,000 to over 70,000 tons. Since han
dling amounts at the Minatoguchi Station are unknown, it is impossible to
compute the relative ratios of each station for total handling amounts along
the entire Railway. Still, on the basis of the logic argued hitherto, there
would be no major error in stating that the Befu-ko and Minatoguchi sta
tions shared among themselves the number 1 and number 2 positions. In
this way, the Befu Light Railway, just like the Banshu Railway, made contri
butions as a connecting line between railway and marine transportation,
and also to materials transport through its connection with the Sanyo
Trunk Line. Although there were strong aspects of the Befu Light Railway
which made it a kind of dedicated railroad for the Taki Seihisho, Taki fertil
izer was, together with the paper produced by the Takasago Branch of the
Mitsubishi Seishi, one of the major chemical products produced in Kako
County; in that sense, the Befu Light Railway made contributions to the
industrialization of the Harima Region.
3) Banden Railway
The Banden Railway, which was originally called the Tatsuno Electric
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Railway, was a track chiefly established for the purpose of transporting the
specialty products and the raw materials along the line. Including Tatsuno
soy sauce and Ibo somen noodles. The planned road called for a trunk line
between AboshI port and HashlsakI, and two branch lines which branched
from that, one to the AboshI Station of the Sanyo Trunk Line, and one to
Tatsuno. Petition for track-laying was made In March 1905, and the govern
ment granted a permit In August 1906 on the basis of the Tramway Track
Ordinance. Construction began In September 1906, and the entire line was
opened In March 1909. However, since there existed limitations In terms of
numbers of rail cars, etc., for tramway-like tracks. In May 1913, the com
pany requested a change from a tramway-like track to designation as a
light railway, with the goal of strengthening the road's carrying capabilities.
Also, the management team of the Tatsuno Railway made a new request
to the government In June 1913 for the establishment of a Shingu Light
Railway to start at HashlsakI and reach to Shingu. They received a license
In July 1913, construction began that November, and the Railway opened
In July 1915. In 1920, together with a change of name to the Banshu Water-
Power and Electric Railway, the line merged with the Tatsuno Electric
Railway. Yet due to an ambitious attempt to expand management through
extending lines, undertaking electricity business, and jointly operating
leisure facilities, business came to a standstill on the Railway, and the line
was put up for auction In 1924 at the request of Its chief creditor, NIhon
Kangyo GInko [Bank]. The bidding went to Setsu TanlguchI, a director at
Gelbl GInko, the company's number two creditor after NIhon Kangyo
GInko. Having received the government's permission. In September 1824,
TanlguchI consigned the license and goodwill of the railway to the newly
established company, the Banden Railway, with TanlguchI himself serving
as the founder. Then, In June 1925, the Banden Railway was launched. It
should be noted that the management of the railway was performed con
tinuously from the time the Tatsuno Railway was opened"^'.
Materials transport on the Banden Railway Is unclear In several aspects.
However, looking at the years 1916-1930, for which freight handling
amounts are known, the number one station In terms of handling quanti
ties was the Aboshl-ko [port] Station, accounting for 40% to 50% of the
whole. This was followed next by the Banden Tatsuno Station, which
accounted for around 30% of handling amounts^®'. Although the product-
by-product details of this freight are unknown, of the freight handled In
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1924 at the Aboshi Station of the Sanyo Line, which neighbored the Aboshi
Station of the Banden Railway, one can confirm that from there, 2,567 tons
of miso [bean paste] soy sauce was sent out, while 3,529 tons of wheat
types, and 1,944 tons of flour, arrived. Soy sauce was a specialty product of
Tatsuno, and wheat was used as a raw material, while flour was a raw
material for the Ibo somen noodles produced along the line. Although the
Banden Railway did not perform joint transport with Ministry railways, it is
thought that there did exist freight connections at the Aboshi Station, and
one can likely infer that the majority of these described freight types were
transported via the Banden Railway"®'. On the other hand, in regards to the
connecting lines between railway and marine transportation of the Aboshi-
ko Station, although it is hard to get a grasp of the actual situation due to
the fact that the respective product types carried out from the Aboshi port
are unknown, looking at the known carried-in carried-out amounts for 1925,
the carried-out amount was 33,394 tons, while the carried-in amount was
even higher, 33,406 tons. Here, using 1912-1916 as years for which product-
by-product types among carried-in carried-out amounts are known, when
one computes the average ratio for industrial reports among all items car
ried out, the answer is 48%; when this is multiplied with the carried-out
amount for 1925, this becomes 16,029 tons. The amount of soy sauce pro
duced in Ibo County in 1925 was 15,841 tons; thus, if one considers that in
1925, roughly the same amount of miso soy sauce was handled at the
Aboshi Station as in 1924, then one can say that there is a high possibility
that this was carried out via the Sanyo Trunk Line, and also that the soy
sauce carried, via the Banden Railway, to the Aboshi-ko Station was carried
out via the port. This point surely also applied to the carrying in of wheat
types and flour®®'. In actual fact, the Tatsuno Railway, with the purpose of
transporting soy sauce and somen noodles, also expanded into the marine
transport business from 1918®^'.
Next, when the focus is turned onto transport demand other than that
for traditional industries, the attention focuses on the Aboshi factory of
Dainihon Seruroido [celluloid] located near the Aboshi Port. The company
was the later embodiment of Nihon Seruroido Jinzo Kenshi [artificial silk],
which was created earlier at the same site in 1908. Due to the idea that it
was either the railroad or marine transportation which would be used for
the transport of the celluloid backing which was the main product of the
company, as well as for the camphor, the raw material for celluloid, fuel.
102
etc., the Tatsuno Railroad announced, in 1916, its policy to establish a
branch line to the factory. However, this plan was not realized, and the
Aboshi factory, which was impacted by the post-War depression, was
forced to close from 1920 to 1924^^) Although it is imagined that the
impacts of the factory closing affected both the railway and carried-in/car-
ried-out amounts at the port, as of the current date, however, the details of
transportation for the factory are unknown. Thus, although as described
above, many portions of the details of materials transport on the Banden
Railway are unknown, it is certain that the connection with the Sanyo Line,
as well as the connecting lines between railway and marine transportation
of the Aboshi-ko Station, were utilized to perform the transport of tradi
tional products of the Harima region, including Tatsuno soy sauce, etc.
4) The Ako Railway
The Ako Railway was a light railway established chiefly for the purpose
of transporting Ako salt. It was citizens who lived along the road who filed
a request in December 1912 to establish the line, and license was granted
by the government in March 1913. The initially planned line called for a
road between Shioya (the Ako port) and Kamigori, with a branch line
extending from therebetween to the Sagoshi port. However, due to the fact
that the expenses required for the construction of the branch line were to
exceed the projections, and as it was determined, due to geographical
topology-related problems, that it would be difficult to make the connection
with the Sanyo Trunk Line at Kamigori, a line modification was performed
in January 1914; here, along with a cancellation of the branch-line laying,
the end point of the trunk line was changed to the Une Station of the
Sanyo Trunk Line. In the permit for the track laying, the deadline for com
pany establishment and for the petition for construction-performance
approval was stipulated as March 1914. However, due to a reduction in the
number of company establishers, as well as delays in the sale of stock due
to the recession, the would-be founders petitioned the government two
times for an extension of this deadline. The Ako Railroad was finally estab
lished in May 1915, petition was made to the government in June for
approval to perform construction, and, with the reception in November of
the permission, work began on the railroad that same month. Although the
deadline for construction completion was November 1917, changes in the
economic climate and delays in purchasing land meant that the construe-
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tion did not go as planned; four times was the deadline extended, after
which, in April 1921, the railway opened between the Banshu Ako and the
Une stations. Nevertheless, the still at that time uncompleted construction
of the Banshu Ako to Shioya portion ran into financial difficulties, and yet
four more construction completion-deadline extensions were requested.
When a fifth extension appeal was made in October 1925, the government,
determining that there was no firmly established prospect that the line
would be opened, denied the request, and canceled the permit for the
Banshu Ako to Shioya portion^'.
Because the railway to connect Banshu Ako and Shioya was "the sole
inland-marine connecting line for reaching the Ako port," and also due to
the fact that both an office and a salt warehouse of the Ministry of
Finance's Monopoly Bureau were located in Shioya, to ensure that the
company could perform the smooth transport of salt a plan was created for
an extension of a freight-shunting line from the Shioya Station to the
Monopoly Bureau warehouse®''*. The fact that the laying of the line
between these two points was not realized is expected to have had an
impact also on materials transport by railroad. Looking at the years 1925-
1930, during which freight handling amounts are known, the Banshu Ako
Station was number one in terms of handling amounts; in terms of the
overall ratio, however, this amount showed wide fluctuations, from
between 30% to 80%, and this point can also be applied to handling quan
tities along the entire railway®®'. Although the product-by-product details of
this freight are unknown, there is no mistake in stating that salt was an
extremely important commodity. In 1924, 8,111 tons of salt was carried
from the Une Station of the Sanyo Trunk Line, and since the Ako Railway
performed joint transport with Ministry railways, there is a strong possibil
ity that this salt was sent from the Banshu Ako Station. However, the
amount quoted accounts for no more than 18% of the 45,801 tons of salt
produced in Ako County that year (1924); one can likely surmise, then, that
the majority of salt was transported not via railways, but was rather carried
out from the Ako port®®'. Although the status of carried-out/carried-in
amounts is unknown for this period for the Ako port, whatever the case, it
is thought that, with the failure to extend the railway to the port, the Ako
Railway failed to sufficiently fulfill its connection functions between marine
and inland transportation; this point was also surely a factor in the unstable
fluctuations which were shown for freight handling amounts.
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From the investigation described hitherto, these four railways shared in
common the point that, through the use of connections between marine
and inland transportation and also with Ministry lines, they each sought the
transport of products produced along their respective lines. Further, the fact
that, with the exception of the Ako Railway, the core part of the transport
was borne by stations which had neighboring connections with their
respective local ports shows the importance of the role played in materials
transport by connecting lines between railway and marine transportation.
(2) Progress in the completion of port facilities and the functions of con
necting lines between railway and marine transportation
The central government, as part of its post-Russo-Japanese War eco
nomic management, established in 1906 Kowan Chosakai [the ports and
harbors investigation board], to perform an investigation of ports and har
bors on a nationwide scale; here, 14 sites were designated as key ports.
These key ports were in turn divided into type 1 and type 2 ports: type 1
ports were to be managed by the national government, while the respec
tive regions were to bear a portion of the repair and construction costs,
while type 2 ports were to be managed by the respective regions, with the
national government bearing a portion of repair and constructions costs.
The remaining ports and harbors were designated as regional ports and
harbors, to be managed independently by each regional government"'. In
Hyogo Prefecture, the Kobe port was designated as a type 1 key port, and,
as seen in a previous section of this article, repair and construction work
began there in 1907. This made the construction of regional ports a key
issue for the government, and the prefectural authorities responded by
performing dredging and facility repair and improvement work. However,
since these measures bore strong emergency response-like aspects®^',
there was a growing necessity to perform drastic port establishment work.
The Hyogo Prefectural Assembly passed, as its ordinary session of
December 1916, an Opinion Document seeking "the arrangement of
ports," and submitted such to Governor Chotaro Kiyono. In regards to port-
related policies hitherto, this Opinion Document stated that these "were
extremely ununified, and were not performed under policies based on any
uniform doctrine." Therefore, the document pointed out that, in order to
"stride forward with arrangements and improvements," there was a need
to "organize a single investigation group under the leadership of the gover-
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nor," and to have this group perform an investigation of ports and
harbors®®'. On the other hand. Governor Kiyono, who had only taken office
in April of that year (1916), evaluated the port establishment work under
taken thus far by the Prefecture as "not exceeding preparations for conve
nience of use for immediate tasks at extraordinary times," and that "there
is a fear that this may cause hindrances to the growth and maturation of
other Japanese cities." He announced a policy whereby, for "the establish
ment of a uniform policy for prefectural ports and harbors," "work on an
investigation of ports and harbors" would be undertaken. Further, having
judged that there was a need for "the utmost prudence and the most thor
ough and painstaking care" in this "investigation of ports and harbors," the
Governor established the "County Regions Ports and Harbors Investigation
Committee," which was to serve as a consultation organ and to be com
prised of top Prefectural Government officials, Prefectural Assembly mem
bers, and lay experts, and appointed the General Manager of the
Prefectural Internal Affairs Division to serve as committee chair®"'.
The first committee meeting was convened in November 1917, and the
Governor assigned the committee an investigation of 56 ports and harbors
in the prefecture. Included as objects of the investigation were, in addition
to commercial ports, refuge harbors and fishing ports; here one can con
firm that the purpose of the investigation was the establishment of a com
prehensive policy for ports and harbors. Having received this commission,
the Committee performed an overview study regarding the investigation
outline. They determined that the investigation categories would be, for
each port, the history, the facilities, inland-marine connection facilities, car-
ried-in/carried-out amounts, ship incomings and outgoings, production and
consumption at the port and in surrounding regions, overview estimations
of required repair and construction costs, etc. On-site investigations began
that very month (November 1917). The point is worthy of special note that,
separately from port and harbor facilities, inland-marine connection facili
ties were assigned their own individual investigation category. The investi
gation, which was performed by civil engineers and recorders under the
management of Prefecture civil engineers, was completed in March 1919,
and the Committee then began its selection of ports and harbors for which
repair and construction would be performed. First, selected as candidates
were the top 22 ports in terms of, as of 1916, carried-in and carried-out
amounts (commercial ports), number of ships seeking refuge (refuge har-
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bors), and numbers of registered fishing ships (fishing harbors). Then, from
the perspective of the degree of necessity for repair and construction work,
and also of ensuring a balanced distribution of ports for the investigation,
14 ports were selected (refer to Table 4). The estimate for repair and con
struction costs rose to 8.57 million yen; at the Prefecture level, however,
repair and construction costs of around 10.0 million yen were expected.
Also, since some bias was still seen in terms of the distribution of the 14
ports, 5 more ports were added thereto, until finally, 19 ports and harbors
were slated for repair and construction work, with construction expenses of
10.15 million yen. The repair and construction work was scheduled to be
performed, in succession, from 1921®^'. The plan, however, did not proceed
as planned, and, as shown in Table 4, construction and repair work was
perforhned at only 10 sites. Further, Befu port was included herein,
although it was not a designated port for repair and construction. Although
the concrete details of the history during this period, and of the repair and
construction work, are not fully known due to gaps in the documentation,
in addition to insufficient fiscal resources, it is also thought that, within the
War period from 1937 on, the fact that non-military related civil engineering
Table 4 Port and harbor repair in Hyogo Prefecture (Planned and actual results)
Ports/harbors for which repair and/or
construction work was performed
Ports/harbors for which
repair and/or construction
work was not performed
Port/Harbor Location
Period of repair/
construction
Port/Harbor Location
Amagasaki O
Shikama O
Akashi O
Befu *
Takasago <C>
Sumoto O
Nishinomiya O
Aioi ♦
Tsuiyama O
Futami O
A
A
A
A
A
B
A
A
C
A
1922-26
1922-24, 32-35
1924-25
1924-25, 27-29
1926-28
1927-30
1932-33
1932-34
1932-36
1933-34
Eigashima O
Oshio O
Aboshi O
Ako ^
Iwaya O
Shizuki ^
Fukura O
Minato ♦
Toshima ^
Kasumi O
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
B
C
(Notes) O • 14 ports first selected for repair and construction.
* : Port added at the repair/construction stage.
A : Seto (Inland) Sea side B : Awaji Island C :
(Source) Hyogoken komonjo doboku 19, doboku.
^ : 5 ports added thereto.
Japan Sea side
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projects were forced into scale-reductions®^) Is also thought to have had a
major Impact. In that sense, one can say that the Issue of port and harbor
establishment was carried over Into the post-War period. Nevertheless,
when one considers that the port construction which was the objective
here was for ports for which the Prefecture recognized the necessity of
repair and construction work. If one were to make a study of the special
characteristics shared In common by these ports, then from that study
would emerge a distinct Idea concerning the way a regional government
thought In regards to harbor repair and construction.
With the exception of Tsuiyama and Sumoto, the ports and harbors at
which construction work was performed were located along the Seto
Inland Sea cost. Here one can recognize that priority was given to the
Hanshin and Harlma Industrial regions: AmagasakI port bore the burden
for the transport of raw materials and products from the various factories
located In AmagasakI City and Kawabe County, while NIshlnomlya port
serve as the point where the sake, the rice for making sake, and also the
raw materials and products, from home and abroad, for the cotton spin
ning mills located near the port were carried In and out. Further, the reason
why the Alol port was added as a site for port construction Is that the
Harlma Zosensho [shipbuilding works] was located at the port, and future
developments of this were anticipated®®). This stance of emphasizing Indus
trial districts can also be seen for Awajl-shlma Island. In operation at
Sumoto, the only port on the Island where construction work was per
formed, was the KanegafuchI Bosekl factory, and the Sumoto port was a
hub port for the carrying In and out of raw materials for Kanebo and for the
transport of Its products. Further, Sumoto was one of the few harbors of
refuge In Hyogo Prefecture; this Is a point also shared by the AkashI and
FutamI ports®^'. In order to secure the safety of navigation lanes, the con
struction of ports of refuge was Indispensable; especially construction and
repair at the AkashI port had an urgent necessity, as this port faced the
AkashI straits, one of the areas In the Seto Inland Sea which was difficult to
navigate. On the other hand. In addition to this point, also worthy of atten
tion Is the relationship of these ports with Inland-marine connecting rail
ways. Of the ports and harbors slated for repair and construction, just as
for the Takasago and Befu ports as described In the previous section of this
article, connecting lines between railway and marine transportation were
also provided at the Shikama port. The Bantan Line which served the port
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was first opened in 1894 as the Bantan Railway. This line was then nation
alized in 1906. The line end-point, the Shikama-ko [port] Station, was situ
ated within the port facilities, and the freight platform, with the design of
even more convenient transport, was provided adjacent to the wharf. The
Shikama port was the largest port in the Harima region in terms of coal car-
ried-in amounts, and sidelines which were laid to the various factories,
including the Shikama factory of Fukushima Boseki, the Himeji factory of
Hinode Boseki, and the Himeji factory of Katakura Seishi Boseki [thread-
making and spinning], etc., were used to supply, via the Bantan Line, coal
as fuel for these factories. Coal was also used as fuel for the locomotives
of the Ministry of Railways. Also, a portion of the products from these
spinning mills were also sent out from the Shikama port, and the freight-
handling amounts at the Shikama-ko station maintained its number one
ranking on the Bantan Line consistently from the time the railway was
opened®®'.
Incidentally, repair and construction was performed on Befu port,
although it was not selected as a port designated for such work, while
conversely, port establishment was not performed at Ako and Aboshi,
although these ports were on the list for repair/construction work. Although
no documents exist which directly show the reason why these measures
were taken, there do exist clues which help us to know that reason. As
shown in Table 4, Ako port was a later addition to the list of ports to be
repaired/constructed; as the reason for that, the Prefecture stated that "with
the dawning of the completion of the Ako Railway, through the repair and
construction of that port, one can make it easy to complete facilities for
connecting land transportation with marine transportation"®®'. In other
words, the Prefecture considered the completion of the Ako Railway as a
pre-requisite condition for port establishment; here, one can imagine that
there was an awareness that only through the joint laying of railway and
port establishment could there first be provided full connections between
land and marine transportation. Incidentally, as stated earlier in this article,
against all expectations, the attempt to extend the Ako Railway to the port
ended in failure. The fact that the Prefecture, which was of the mind as
explained above, would then cancel the establishment work at the Ako port
can thus be said to be only a naturally expected measure. However, even
in that case, too, one can still surmise that the Prefecture was not simply of
the mind that merely the laying of a railway was in itself sufficient. That is.
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construction at the Aboshi port, to which the Banden Railway was con
nected, was also canceled. Here, when one considers the differences
between the Banden Railway and the other railways in terms of inland-
marine connecting transport, one's attention is focused on the existence, or
the lack thereof, of a long-term, common business relationship with a mod
ern factory or factories. These other railways showed a relationship of sta
bilized freight transport for their respective factories: the Bantan Railway
with Mitsubishi Seishi, Kanegafuchi Boseki, and Nihon Keori, the Befu Light
Railway with the Taki Seihisho, and the Bantan Railway with the spinning
factories of Fukushima, Hinode, and Katakura. Conversely, in the case of
the Banden Railway, its relationship with the Aboshi factory of Dainihon
Seruroido showed a lack of stability, in that the factory was closed due to
the post-War depression, and the period the factory was closed overlapped
with the time when the port construction and repair work was getting
underway. The Prefecture, which viewed inland-marine connecting rail
ways as a priority in terms of the support for the transport aspects of the
main factories which were the flag-bearers for the industrialization of
Hyogo Prefecture, can be surmised as having given top priority to the
establishment of those ports which were connected with a railroad; there is
a strong possibility that repair and construction work for the Befu Port was
also performed on the basis of this perspective. Through this repair and
construction work on ports, for which a key part was the formation of con
necting lines between railway and marine transportation, the Prefecture
can be said to have played a role in strengthening and expanding the infra-
structural base for the industrialization of its regions.
5. Conclusion
From the considerations described above, one can summarize as fol
lows the special characteristics of the formation of a transportation infra
structure in the late Meiji-Taisho Periods. From the time of the late-period
of the Meiji Period, when the railway network was developed, in order to
realize more efficient transport, smooth connections between railways and
marine transportation became an important issue; in Hyogo Prefecture, the
central government performed establishment work at the Kobe port for
both of the key aspects of inland-marine connection facilities, the railroad
and the port. On the other hand, Hyogo Prefecture performed an investiga-
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tion of the ports and harbors within the prefecture, established a frame
work for the establishment of regional ports and harbors, and, as a key part
of this work, performed repair and construction work at ports which were
provided with an inland-marine connecting railway. In the framework for
port establishment as established by the central government's Kowan
Chosakai, Kobe port was designated as a type 1 key port under the direct
control of the nation, while the regional ports and harbors were placed
under the control of the metropolitan and prefectural governments. The
case of Hyogo Prefecture shows how the authorities of one prefectural gov
ernment bore its responsibility for regional port and harbor establishment;
here, in accordance with the framework for port establishment existing at
the nationwide level, the Hyogo prefectural authorities established their
own framework for establishment work at the regional level, and then the
Prefecture went to work on the repair and construction of ports and har
bors. It can thus be said that, from the late Meiji Period on, port establish
ment work advanced with the central government and the regional
governments dividing the responsibilities between themselves, and that
here, an issue which became of great importance was the formation of
connecting lines between railway and marine transportation.
In Hyogo Prefecture, these types of inland-marine connection facilities
were formed to be chiefly centered at the ports of the industrial regions,
and in that process, both the prefectural and central governments placed
the emphasis on the smooth transport of modern industrial products. This
point is in contrast with the chief governmental policy issue up through the
middle period of the Meiji Period, which was the securing of transport
routes for the products of traditional industries®^'. Here, one can glimpse
that, together with the development and progress of industrialization, there
was also a change in issues related to infrastructure creation. From the
example case of Hyogo Prefecture, both the central and prefectural govern
ments responded to these changes, via the formation of connecting lines
between railway and marine transportation; one can thus point out that
these governments fulfilled their respective roles in the promotion, in terms
of its transport aspects, of industrialization. On the other hand, the expan
sion and strengthening of inland-marine connection facilities was also
linked to the promotion of imports, exports, and via-port carried-in and car-
ried-out amounts. Thus, one special characteristic of the formation of a
transportation infrastructure in the late Meiji and Taisho Periods was the
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goal of also forming transport networks which spread to throughout Japan
and overseas. The point that the transport network was given priority
emphasis is a characteristic shared in common with the transportation
infrastructure creation which took place up through to the middle Meiji
Period However, for the transportation infrastructure which was charac
terized by its low density up through the mid-Meiji Period, an issue of the
utmost urgency was network creation for each individual infrastructure. In
contrast to this, in the transportation network development from the late
Meiji Period on, which had as its axis railways and marine transportation,
there was a growing importance for mutual connections between infra
structures for the realization of even smoother transport, and there was a
corresponding demand for the formation, expansion, and strengthening of
connecting lines between railway and marine transportation.
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